How did the crisis affect small and medium-sized enterprises? -- from a field study of the metal-working industry in Java

This paper focuses on the impact of Indonesia's economic crisis on small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). It shows how the performance of SMEs during the crisis varied widely even in the same industrial subsector, and found that the factors most affecting performance have been market orientation and the linkages that the SMEs have formed with the buyers of their products. Well-performing SMEs were found to have utilized putting-out linkages with wholesalers which enabled them to switch to products having better markets. On the other hand, the SMEs which had subcontracting linkages with assemblers or contracting linkages with user-factories (with the exception of SMEs having export-oriented linkages) suffered badly in the crisis because of specificity of products with little room for switching. The paper also found that exposure to debt due to borrowing for investment has been another factor affecting performance, but that enterprise size has had no linear correlation with performance.

How does credit access affect children's time allocation? Evidence from rural India

Using a unique dataset obtained from rural Andhra Pradesh, India that contains direct observations of household access to credit and detailed time use, results of this study indicate that credit market failures lead to a substantial reallocation of time used by children for activities such as schooling, household chores, remunerative work, and leisure. The negative effects of credit constraints on schooling amount to a 60% decrease of average schooling time. However, the magnitude of decrease due to credit constraints is about half that of the increase in both domestic and remunerative child labor, the other half appearing to come from a reduction in leisure.

How does contract design affect the uptake of microcredit among the ultra-poor? : experimental evidence from the river islands of Northern Bangladesh

Despite the professed claims of microcredit alleviating poverty, little is known about what kind of credit contract is suitable for extremely poor households, also called the ultra-poor. To fill this knowledge gap, we initiated a field experiment in the river islands of northern Bangladesh, where a substantial portion of dwellers could be categorized as ultra-poor due to cyclic floods. We randomly offered four types of loans to such dwellers: regular small cash loans with one-year maturity, large cash loans with three-year maturity both with and without a one-year grace period, and in-kind livestock loans with three-year maturity and a one-year grace period. We compared uptake rates as well as the determinants of uptake and found that the uptake rate is the lowest for the regular contract, followed by the in-kind contract. Contrary to prior belief, we also found that the microcredit demand by the ultra-poor is not necessarily small, and in particular the ultra-poor are significantly more likely to join a microcredit program than the moderately poor if a grace period with longer maturity is attached to a large amount of credit, irrespective of whether the credit is provided in cash or in kind. This paper provides evidence that a typical microcredit contract with one-year maturity and without a grace period is not attractive to the ultra-poor. Microfinance institutions may need to design better credit contracts to address the poor's needs.